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PROTECTING STUDENTS, PROTECTING CONSUMERS:
A NEW FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE FOR-PROFIT
DISTANCE LEARNING INDUSTRY
Menesha Mannapperuma*
The rise of online distance learning portends new promises of a
college degree for students who are less likely to attend a traditional
two- or four-year college or university. Online for-profit educational
institutions have rushed to meet the needs of these students. However, the
for-profit distance learning industry, generally lightly regulated from its
inception, has been dogged with accusations that it places profits before
the interests of its students. While a system of proposed regional
interstate compacts promise to standardize oversight of the for-profit
distance learning industry, it fails to include states that regulate the
industry the least and thus fails to protect students who are most likely to
need protection. This Article proposes a modification to the interstate
compact system: by tying federal Title IV funds to consumer protection
efforts, the regional interstate compacts can standardize regulation of
the for-profit distance learning industry while providing students with
basic consumer protections that can help rectify the most egregious
problems associated with the for-profit distance learning industry.
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INTRODUCTION
For thousands of years, most interactive learning has been
through face-to-face interactions between students and instructors.
With the rise of distance learning during the mid-nineteenth
century, this began to change. Students began taking
“correspondence courses” through which they used the postal
service to receive lessons and submit their work for grading.1 Now,
a new revolution is taking place in the distance learning industry.
The ubiquity of Internet technology in recent years has made
distance learning easier than ever.2 The ease with which this
technology allows students to access a professor or course has
resulted in a proliferation of online courses, often as part of degreegranting programs offered by for-profit universities.3 Distance
1

What is Distance Learning?: History of Distance Learning, CAL.
DISTANCE
LEARNING
PROJECT,
http://www.cdlponline.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=whatis&pg=3 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter CAL. DISTANCE
LEARNING PROJECT, What is Distance Learning?].
2
This Article will focus on for-profit higher education institutions that
offer distance learning courses. However, prominent universities such as
Stanford offer free online courses to the general public, with Stanford’s five free
online courses garnering more than 335,000 participants in the spring of 2012.
Jamie Beckett, Stanford Offers More Free Online Courses for the World,
STANFORD NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/march/
online-courses-mitchell-030612.html. In May 2012, Harvard and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology announced the formation of a nonprofit partnership,
edX, to offer free online courses from both universities. Tamar Lewin, Harvard
and MIT Team Up to Offer Free Online Courses, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/education/harvard-and-mit-team-up-tooffer-free-online-courses.html.
3

In 2007–08, about 4.3 million undergraduate students, or 20
percent of all undergraduates, took at least one distance
education course. About 0.8 million, or 4 percent of all
undergraduates, took their entire program through distance
education . . . . In addition to these undergraduate students,
about 0.8 million, or 22 percent, of all postbaccalaureate
students took distance education courses in 2007–08. The
percentage of postbaccalaureate students who took their entire
program through distance education (9 percent) was higher
than the percentage at the undergraduate level.
Fast Facts: Distance Learning, NAT’L. CTR. FOR EDUC. & STATS.,
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learning increases access to education for individuals who may not
otherwise be able to obtain it, such as those with families or
disabilities, or who live in remote areas.4
Despite its advantages, regulation of distance learning has
proven problematic. Degree-granting programs offered by forprofit distance learning institutions are particularly troublesome
due to the lack of regulatory experience in dealing with these
programs.
Furthermore, recent investigations and student
complaints have revealed that for-profit universities have at times
taken advantage of ill-informed or vulnerable populations.
For-profit institutions account for over nine percent of the
national population of students enrolled at higher education
institutions.5 The rapid growth of for-profit universities has been
met with numerous reports of improper practices. These reports
have resulted in increased scrutiny from the media and both the
federal and state governments. A 2010 PBS Frontline special shed
light on questionable recruitment tactics, high student loan debt
burdens, and poor overall educational outcomes associated with
these institutions.6 In 2010, Iowa Senator Tom Harkin led a series
of Congressional hearings that focused on for-profit universities’
alleged improprieties, which included allegations that they made
misleading claims regarding program credentials and used
deceptive and fraudulent sales tactics.7 The Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) conducted undercover testing of
fifteen for-profit colleges and found that all fifteen made
“deceptive or otherwise questionable” statements to undercover

http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=80 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
4
CAL. DISTANCE LEARNING PROJECT, What is Distance Learning?, supra
note 1.
5
For-profit Colleges and Universities, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE. LEGS.,
(July 3, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/for-profit-colleges-anduniversities.aspx.
6
PBS Frontline: College, Inc. (PBS television broadcast May 4, 2010),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/view/.
7
Thomas L. Harnisch, Am. Ass’n of State Colls. & Univs., Changing
Dynamics in State Oversight of For-Profit Colleges, POL’Y MATTERS, April
2012, at 1, 3, available at http://www.aascu.org/uploadedFiles/AASCU/Content/
Root/PolicyAndAdvocacy/PolicyPublications/Policy_Matters/Changing%20Dy
namics%20in%20State%20Oversight%20of%20For-Profit%20Colleges.pdf.
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applicants, and that four of them engaged in fraudulent practices.8
Moreover, in August 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a
lawsuit against the Education Management Corporation, an
operator of private for-profit postsecondary educational
institutions. The primary charge against the company was that it
paid recruiters based solely on the number of students enrolled—a
violation of a federal law that prohibits colleges from providing
any commission or incentive based either directly or indirectly on
securing enrollment of students.9
The Department of Education responded to increasing concern
that the industry needed more oversight when it published the 2010
Program Integrity Rules. One of these rules (the “Online State
Authorization Rule”) requires higher education institutions
offering distance-learning courses to obtain authorization from
each state in which it does business if that state requires its own
form of authorization.10 Thus, the Online State Authorization Rule
would require programs to obtain approval in each state in which
they operate, otherwise the program would risk losing federal
funds under Title IV.11 While the Department of Education does
not currently enforce the Online State Authorization Rule, it is
widely believed that this rule will be reintroduced in 2015.
However, the debate surrounding the Online State
Authorization Rule brought to light the complexity of the state
8

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-984T, FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND
ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES (2010)
[hereinafter GAO, UNDERCOVER TESTING], available at http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-10-948T.
9
Stephen Burd, A Non-Profit College Recruiting Scandal?, HIGHER ED
WATCH (June 14, 2011), http://higheredwatch.newamerica.net/node/53064;
Charles Huckabee, Whistle-Blower Suit Against Education Management Corp.
to Proceed, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 7, 2014), http://chronicle.com/
blogs/ticker/whistle-blower-suit-against-education-management-corp-canproceed-judge-says/77179.
10
State Authorization, 34 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2013); see also State
Authorization, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,858–68 (Oct. 29, 2010) (providing legislative
history for 34 C.F.R. § 600.9).
11
Allie Bidwell, Many Colleges Could Lose Federal Aid Eligibility Under
New Interpretation of Rule, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (April 3, 2013),
http://chronicle.com/article/Many-Colleges-Could-Lose/138263/.
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authorization regulatory scheme both for institutions seeking state
authorization and the students enrolled at these institutions.12 As a
result, the Commission on the Regulation of Postsecondary
Distance Education (“Commission”) is working toward creating a
set of regional interstate compacts that will remove some of the
regulatory hurdles facing higher education institutions that attempt
to procure authorization in more than one state.13 However, the
regional interstate compacts focus primarily on easing the burden
on higher education institutions that offer distance education,
rather than ensuring that student consumers are protected.14
Moreover, according to Marshal Hill, former Executive Director of
the Nebraska Coordinating Committee for Postsecondary
Education, states with subpar consumer protection frameworks will
be excluded from the compacts entirely.15 Thus, the interstate
compacts do not provide for or improve the consumer protection
available to the students located in these excluded states.
This Article proposes a new federal regulation that would tie
Title IV federal funding of for-profit distance learning institutions
to the consumer protection standards of the state in which the
institution is headquartered. The proposed regulation would thus
allow federal funds only for distance learning institutions

12

COMM’N ON THE REG. OF POSTSECONDARY DISTANCE EDUC.,
ADVANCING ACCESS THROUGH REGULATORY REFORM: FINDINGS, PRINCIPLES,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STATE AUTHORIZATION RECIPROCITY
AGREEMENT (SARA) 7 (2013) [hereinafter ADVANCING ACCESS].
13
Id. at 3. The Commission is composed of former U.S. Secretary of
Education Richard Riley and twenty other higher education leaders invited by
the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities and the State Higher
Education Executive Officers to “explore the regulation of postsecondary
distance education.” The Commission was convened in May 2012 to “develop
and provide recommendations that will address the costs and inefficiencies faced
by postsecondary institutions that must comply with multiple (often
inconsistent) state laws and regulations as they endeavor to provide educational
opportunities to students in multiple state jurisdictions.” Id.
14
Id. at 6 (“Complexity, confusion, and costs of compliance can be reduced
if state laws and regulations embody common principles and/or rules are
established that narrow compliance obligations [for institutions] . . . .”).
15
Interview with Marshall Hill, Executive Director, Neb. Coordinating
Comm. for Postsecondary Educ. (Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Hill Interview].
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headquartered in states with adequate consumer protection
frameworks.
Part I provides an overview of the distance learning industry,
with a particular focus on for-profit universities. It explores the
risks that accompany for-profit universities, including the risks that
these institutions in particular pose to their students and the
accompanying financial liabilities that accrue to taxpayers and the
federal government. In addition, this Part outlines the history of the
regulation of education in the United States, focusing on the
regulatory triad: private, nongovernmental accrediting bodies; the
federal government; and the states.
Part II introduces the federal government’s Online State
Authorization Rule, its current status, and the varying state
authorization schemes for higher education institutions that offer
distance learning courses. It then discusses the problems created by
the complexities of the state authorization regulatory structure.
Part III presents a case study of California’s regulatory
structure and assesses the deficiencies of the structure and how
those deficiencies negatively affect student consumer protection in
the state. It then describes the regulatory structure in Ohio, a state
with a robust authorization process for higher education
institutions. Part III then compares the state authorization
regulatory frameworks in California and Ohio.
Finally, Part IV introduces a regional interstate compact system
and analyzes the deficiencies of this system. It then proposes a
solution that involves tying federal funding of for-profit distance
education providers to state consumer protection frameworks, a
proposal that may help close current gaps in consumer protection.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISTANCE LEARNING INDUSTRY

This Part introduces the concept of distance learning, including
its benefits and its growth in the United States. Next, it covers forprofit universities, including the problematic practices of these
universities and how these practices hurt students. Finally, this Part
explores the “regulatory triad”: the three regulatory authorities that
oversee the education sector: private, nongovernmental accrediting
bodies; the federal government; and states.
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A. Distance Learning: Benefits and Statistics

Distance learning greatly increases the availability and
accessibility of education. It allows for both synchronous learning
(when students and classroom instructors interact simultaneously)
and asynchronous learning (when students choose when to access
lessons and course materials, and communicate with their
instructors).16 For students with families, disabilities, or limited
transportation options, distance learning can reduce these barriers
and make degree attainment possible.17 For schools, distance
learning can lower costs and provide opportunities for
collaboration across school systems.18 For example, while distance
learning among the three public higher education segments in
California (California Community Colleges, California State
Universities, and the University of California) is currently
fragmented, analysis suggests that these segments could
collaborate to produce significant savings through shared online
courses, joint academic collaboration, and public-private
partnerships.19
Distance education has grown rapidly: “In 2007–08, about 4.3
million undergraduate students, or 20 percent of all
undergraduates, took at least one distance education course. About
0.8 million, or 4 percent of all undergraduates, took their entire
program through distance education.”20 In 2012, about 18.2
million, or about 11 percent of all undergraduates, took their entire
program through distance education.21 Distance education has
helped fuel the growth of the for-profit industry—“nearly ninety
percent of the for-profit industry’s growth from 2000-2009 can be

16

MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE MASTER PLAN AT
50: USING DISTANCE EDUCATION TO INCREASE COLLEGE ACCESS AND
EFFICIENCY 6 (2010). This report was presented to the 197th Session of the
California legislature at the California Student Aid Commission Public Hearing
on February 23–24, 2012. Id.
17
Id.
18
See id.
19
Id.
20
NAT’L. CTR. FOR EDUC. & STATS., supra note 3.
21
Enrollment in Distance Education Courses, by State: Fall 2012, NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS. (June 2014), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014023.pdf.
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B. For-Profit Universities: Problematic Practices
For-profit educational institutions—also referred to as forprofit colleges, proprietary institutions, trade schools, or private
career schools—are postsecondary higher education institutions
that “provid[e] job-focused education and skills while deriving a
profit.”23 In comparison, nonprofit colleges and universities
reinvest tuition money into the university, and thus individual
stakeholders in the university do not stand to benefit financially
from increased student enrollment.24 For-profit universities in the
United States enroll approximately thirteen percent of the national
population of students at higher education institutions.25 As a result
of the for-profit industry’s growth—and the concomitant
allegations of improper practices—for-profits have been the focus
of increased scrutiny from federal and state governments and the
media. Further, “for-profits educate a disproportionate share of
minority, disadvantaged, and older students,” which raises
22

Harnisch, supra note 7, at 2.
Cheryl Auster, Promising a Better Future but Delivering Debt:
Understanding the Financial and Social Impact of For-Profit Colleges and the
Effect of the New Program Integrity Rules, 13 SCHOLAR 631, 637 (2011).
23

24

Notwithstanding the historical or present rationales for
nonprofit status, there is the strong tendency to associate
nonprofits with a sense of altruism that is absent from forprofit firms. Nonprofit higher educational institutions, unlike
FPCUs [for-profit colleges and universities], receive
significant donations from third parties. To an extent,
nonprofit status may serve as a crude heuristic for quality in
the higher education context. One can argue that nonprofit
organization limits managerial incentives to exploit students
and makes managers less sensitive to profit maximization.
Omari Scott Simmons, For-Profits and the Market Paradox, 48 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 333, 348–49 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
25
Obama Administration Takes Action to Protect Americans from
Predatory, Poor-Performing Career Colleges, U.S. D EP’ T OF E DUC . (Mar. 14,
2014),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-takesaction-protect-americans-predatory-poor-performing-ca.
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concerns about exploitation of society’s more vulnerable
populations.26
These students often lack both information crucial to making
informed decisions about college and the “familial and
extrafamilial networks, through which they can gather important
information concerning higher education.”27 Research indicates
that these students approach college decisions in a more ad hoc
manner than students from privileged backgrounds, often failing to
gather sufficient information about educational quality when
making important decisions such as school selection.28 Moreover,
if these students attend public schools, they are also likely to lack
access to individualized counseling about their higher education
options.29 Thus, these students are more likely to both misinterpret
information about, and be misled by, for-profit higher education
institutions.30
Moreover, the profit-driven mission of these institutions
increases their incentive to enroll more students.31 This incentive
can result in deceptive marketing and recruitment practices that

26

Kelly Field, Study Finds Mixed Results for Students Attending For-Profit
Schools, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 3, 2012), http://chronicle.com/
blogs/ticker/study-finds-mixed-results-for-students-attending-for-profitcolleges/39474. “Affluent students cluster at four-year public and private
universities, whereas working class, low-income, veterans, and underrepresented
minority students cluster at two-year community colleges and FPCUs [for-profit
colleges and universities].” Omari Scott Simmons, For-Profits and the Market
Paradox, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 359 (2013).
27
Simmons, supra note 26, at 351–52.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 352.
30
Id. This information asymmetry is further enhanced by the easy entry
into for-profit higher education institutions. Id. at 337 (“But the portable and
loan-heavy nature of federal financial aid also has a downside: ill-informed,
vulnerable students may be duped into selecting inferior educational options that
differentially empower them.”).
31
Id. at 352–53 (“At traditional institutions, tuition rarely exceeds total
education costs due to institutional subsidies. FPCUs [for-profit colleges and
universities], however, do not subsidize a meaningful portion of total
educational costs. Instead, FPCUs charge tuition that normally exceeds total
education costs. Within this context, hard-selling techniques used by FPCUs are
not surprising; they are expected.”).
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ignore students’ best interests.32 In 2010, undercover testing by the
GAO found that for-profit universities engaged in fraudulent
practices.33 GAO agents posed undercover as prospective students
and applied for admission to fifteen for-profit colleges located in
six states and Washington, D.C.34 The testing found that some forprofit college representatives exaggerated potential future earnings,
failed to provide clear information about program costs and
graduation rates, and pressured applicants to sign contracts for
enrollment without providing them with a financial advisor to
counsel them on program costs and financing options.35
Students at for-profit universities also tend to borrow more
heavily to finance their education than students enrolled at other
types of universities. A recent study indicated “that 94% of
students who enroll at for-profit colleges take out federal loans to
pay for tuition, compared [to] 33% of students at public nonprofit
colleges[,] and 69% of students at private nonprofit universities.”36
In addition, a Department of Education study determined that
although for-profit universities enrolled only about thirteen percent
of the nation’s undergraduates in 2010, their students comprised
close to half of all federal student loan defaults in fiscal year 2012
for loans that went into repayment in fiscal year 2010.37
Large amounts of student debt affect the student and the public
in several ways: “(1) the financial burden on the individual
32

See GAO, UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 8, at 7–13.
Id. Revisions were made to this report in November 2010. For an article
critical of this report and its revisions see Nick Anderson, GAO Revises Its
Report Critical of Practices at For-Profit Schools, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2010,
8:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/07/
AR2010120706803.html.
34
GAO, UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 8, at 2.
35
Id. at 9–11.
36
Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at Proprietary
Institutions of Higher Education and What Can Be Done to Reduce Them, 40
J.L. & EDUC. 225, 232 (2011).
37
Tbl.331.20 Enrollment in degree–granting postsecondary institutions:
2000–2012, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (November 2013), http://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_331.20.asp; Tbl. 332.5: Postsecondary student
loan repayment and default statistics, by default period and level and control of
institution: 2009–2011, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS. (December 2013),
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_332.50.asp.
33
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[student]; (2) the expense of loan subsidies to taxpayers; and (3)
the negative effect of defaults on the individual and the
taxpayer.”38 If a student is unable to pay back a loan due to
economic hardship, the student may request forbearance of the
loan, which “results in the government waiving interest
payments.”39 While forbearance represents a gain for the
individual debt-holder, taxpayers ultimately must pay the costs.40
When students default on loans, the federal government and
taxpayers “assume nearly all the risk[s] and are left with the
costs.”41
However, this is not to understate the impact that defaulting on
student loans has on the students themselves. Students who default
on loans suffer a variety of negative consequences, including poor
credit ratings, possible prohibition from obtaining a professional
license,42 wage garnishment, the inability to qualify for future
student loans, and collection harassment.43 Further, student loan
debt is more difficult to discharge than most other types of debt.44
In a typical Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, “a court sells the
debtor’s assets and the creditors receive the proceeds from the sale
of the assets.”45 The court then discharges the remainder of the
debtor’s obligations to creditors, including, for example, credit
card debt or debt related to medical bills.46 In contrast, with student
loan debt, a student must generally convince a bankruptcy judge

38

Auster, supra note 23, at 667–68.
Id. at 668.
40
Id.
41
GAO, UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 8, at 5.
42
See, e.g., T ENN . CODE ANN. §63-1-141 (West 2010).
43
Id.
44
Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
527, 611 (2013) (“Whereas the U.S. Bankruptcy Code generally gives individual
borrowers an ‘insurance policy’ against failure in the form of a bankruptcy
discharge, student loans are somewhat more difficult to discharge than most
kinds of debt.”).
45
Amy E. Sparrow, Unduly Harsh: The Need to Examine Educational
Value in Student Loan Discharge
Cases Involving For-Profit Schools, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 329, 342 (2007).
46
Id.
39
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that he or she suffered an “undue hardship,” a standard which is
difficult to meet.47
C. The Regulatory Triad and Consumer Protection
The regulatory bodies of the higher education sector are often
referred to as the “regulatory triad”—private, nongovernmental
accrediting bodies, the federal government, and states.48 While
regulation of the higher education sector is considered a shared
responsibility of the regulatory triad, the limited regulatory power
of the federal government and accrediting agencies over higher
education institutions means that states are in the best oversight
position.49 However, states vary considerably in their consumer
protection activities and enforcement.50 Typically, state consumer
protection in the realm of higher education includes regulations on
advertising, educational outcomes, personnel credentials, and
consumer complaints.51 Generally, either the state’s higher
education commission or consumer protection agency oversees this
regulatory activity.52

47

See id. at 331–32. To determine what constitutes an “undue hardship,” a
majority of circuits have adopted the three part test articulated in Brunner v. N.Y.
State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987). The three part
Brunner test requires a debtor to show:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income
and expenses, a ‘minimal’ standard of living for herself and
her dependents if forced to repay the loans;
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state
of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the
repayment period of the student loans; and
(3) that the debtor had made good faith efforts to repay the
loans.
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396; see also, Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured
Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329,
373–81 (2013) (providing an in depth analysis of each of the three prongs of the
Brunner test and what a debtor needs to prove to satisfy them).
48
Harnisch, supra note 7, at 1.
49
See id. at 8.
50
Id. at 9.
51
Id.
52
See id.
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1. Accrediting Agencies

Accrediting agencies are private, nongovernmental entities
designed to ensure that higher education institutions meet a certain
level of quality. These private educational associations, either
regional or national in scope, “develop criteria and conduct peer
evaluations to assess whether or not those criteria are met.”53
National agencies focus on accrediting for-profit schools, whereas
regional agencies focus on accrediting public and nonprofit
universities.54 If an institution or program meets an accrediting
agency’s criteria, it becomes “accredited.”
The Department of Education requires that institutions be
accredited in order to receive Title IV funds.55 Accrediting
agencies thus have the power to provide or deny access to billions
of dollars of federal education benefits each year.56 Critics of
accreditation assert that the process is not sufficiently rigorous to
safeguard this substantial amount of money.57 Further, institutions
often use their accreditation status as a means of promoting
legitimacy, which can be problematic because approval by an
accrediting agency does not necessarily ensure the quality of a
school.58

53

Accrediting Agencies, CAL. POSTSECONDARY EDUC. COMM’N (March 28,
2012,
6:05
PM),
http://www.cpec.ca.gov/x_collegeguide_old/
accreditingagencies.asp.
54
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 112TH
CONG., S. PRT. NO. 112–37: FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO
SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 141
(Comm. Print 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT112SPRT74931/pdf/CPRT-112SPRT74931.pdf. [hereinafter FOR PROFIT
HIGHER EDUCATION].
55
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1099b, 1099c-1 (2014).
56
FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 145–46.
57
Eric Kelderman, In Accreditation Proposals, Panel Pleases Neither
Reformers nor Status Quo Advocates, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (April 13, 2012),
http://chronicle.com/article/In-Accreditation-Proposals/131561/.
These
criticisms came from panelists on the National Advisory Committee on
Institutional Quality and Integrity, “an 18-member panel that advises the
education secretary on whether to approve accrediting agencies as gatekeepers
of federal financial aid.” Id.
58
See id. (“Accreditation currently gives students and parents a false sense
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Accrediting agencies are under increasing scrutiny, in part
because of the view that they have not adequately dealt with
recruiting and enrollment fraud.59 This may be the result of the fast
growth of the for-profit education sector, which has “outpaced
accrediting agencies’ efforts to measure and enforce basic
standards of quality in higher education.”60 In the past, accrediting
agencies oversaw institutions whose primary focus was academic
improvement.61 Now, the education sector, and specifically the forprofit education sector, is also driven by profit maximization and
growth.62 As a result, accreditors are “behind the curve” and do not
have in place the policy framework and procedures necessary to
adequately deal with the changing landscape of the higher
education sector.63
Moreover, policy makers and the public have high expectations
for accreditation. Accreditation is expected to serve as a barrier
against abuse and fraud, a means of measuring academic
performance, a tool for parents and students to compare the value
that accredited schools have passed a meaningful test of quality when they have
not.”). See also FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 142 (“The
self-reporting and peer-review nature of the accreditation process exposes it to
manipulation . . . .”); Judith S. Eaton, U.S. Accreditation: Meeting the
Challenges of Accountability and Student Achievement, 5 EVALUATION IN
HIGHER ED. 1, 12 (June 2011) (noting that accreditors “view accountability as
primarily a ‘formative’ process,” which means that “when accreditors review
institutions and programs and find flaws in [their] operations, [the accreditors]
call for remediation of deficiencies even as they . . . continue accreditation.”).
59
See FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 145–46 (noting
that ACICS, one of two major national accrediting agencies, “recently
announced that it had revised its placement data for each of its 49 campuses
under scrutiny by the New York State attorney general . . . [with the revisions
showing] that only 13 of the 49 campuses met the accreditor’s placement-rate
standards.”). See generally Sam Dillon, Troubles Grow for a University Built
on Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/02/11/education/11phoenix.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(discussing
University of Phoenix’s legal troubles resulting from inadequate enrollment and
credit hour standards, fraudulent graduation rate reporting and other substantial
improprieties related to student recruitment and enrollment).
60
FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 144.
61
Id. at 144–45.
62
Id. at 144.
63
Id. at 144–46.
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of different colleges, and “as a stamp of financial stability.”64
However, accrediting agencies often do not have the staff or legal
authority to conduct investigations into consumer complaints.65
Accrediting agencies typically have only one powerful tool against
noncompliant higher education institutions—disaccreditation.66
The lack of graduated disciplinary methods thus inhibits the
effectiveness of accrediting agencies.67
2. The Federal Government
Within the regulatory triad, the federal government oversees
the administration of federal student aid funds and evaluates
institutional eligibility to participate in federal student aid
programs.68 Before 1972, only nonprofit and public institutions
were eligible for Title IV funding.69 Beginning in 1972, Congress
authorized for-profit institutions to receive federal student loans
and grants through the Department of Education.70 In making this
change, Congress recognized that for-profit institutions had “done

64

Eric Kelderman, Accreditors Examine Their Flaws as Calls for Change
Intensify, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 3, 2011), http://chronicle.com/
article/Accreditors-Examine-Their/129765/.
65
Id.
66
Harnisch, supra note 7, at 8.
67
Kevin Carey, A Tale of ‘Too Big to Fail’ in Higher Education, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/upshot/city-collegeof-san-francisco-survives.html?_r=0. “The accreditor, an independent, nonprofit
body that determines whether colleges can receive federal financial aid, is the
only outside organization with substantial regulatory authority over schools like
City College. But like an army with no weapons other than thermonuclear
bombs, its power is too potent and blunt to use.” Id. Carey also explains why
accreditation agencies are often unwilling to take the final step of
disaccreditation. Id. The reasons he provides range from political pressure to the
unwillingness of college administrators to “condemn peers at other institutions
publicly, particularly since their turn for review will eventually come.” Id.
68
Accreditation in the United States, U.S. D EP’ T OF E DUC .,
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg3.html#Recognition
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
69
Simmons, supra note 24, at 339.
70
FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 153.
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well the socially valuable job of training people for technical and
semi-professional careers.”71
As a result, for-profit universities’ existence is premised on the
availability of these substantial federal funds. However, in the
Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Congress limited the
proportion of Department of Education funds available to for-profit
colleges to a percentage of their total revenue.72 After these
amendments, for-profit colleges were limited to receiving federal
student aid funds equal to 85 percent of their revenue.73 The
proportion has now increased to 90 percent, commonly referred to
as the “90/10 rule.”74 These rules were designed to ensure that
students, employers, and state agencies contribute to a student’s
education, and thus have a stake in the success of a student’s
educational outcome.75 Failure to abide by the 90/10 rule results in
penalties for the school, including federal financial aid
ineligibility.76
Despite these measures that were designed to safeguard
students and prevent abuse of the federal financial aid system, the
federal government does not have a comprehensive consumer
protection scheme for students. Similar to the limited consumer
protection role of accreditation agencies, the federal government
has only a limited ability to help aggrieved students. Students with
complaints specifically related to student loans can file a complaint
with the Federal Student Aid Ombudsman Office, which will work
with students, officers of the U.S. Department of Education,
private lenders, loan guaranty agencies and servicing agencies in
order to resolve disputes related only to student loans.77 However,

71

Johnson, supra note 36, at 240 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-554, pt. 1 at
2484 (1972)).
72
FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 154.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 156.
75
Id. at 154–55.
76
Id. at 156. “Colleges that fail to comply with the rule for two consecutive
years lose their eligibility to participate in the student-aid programs for at least
two years.” Alina Mogilyanskaya, 3 For-Profits Lose Student-Aid Eligibility
After Failing 90/10 Test Twice, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. A22 (Oct. 5, 2012),
available at http://chronicle.com/article/3-Institutions-Lose/134696/.
77
Getting Prepared Before Seeking Help, FED. STUDENT AID,
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the Federal Student Aid Ombudsman Office does not handle
complaints about such issues as the quality of educational
programming, recruiting practices, or issues with credits received
for courses, among other things.
3. States
States typically provide higher education institutions with the
legal authority to operate, and students with consumer protections.
They may also regulate standards for participation in state student
financial aid programs.78 States approaches education oversight
differently. The result is that some states have robust regulatory
schemes, while others have far laxer systems. These varying state
regulatory schemes lead to complexities for higher education
institutions and students, as discussed in Part II.
II.

FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF POSTSECONDARY
DISTANCE LEARNING: A FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO
REGULATION

Typically, the regulation of education is the province of state
governments.79 However, a 2010 federal regulation introduced
federal oversight into the distance learning industry.80 This Part
introduces the 2010 federal regulation, which required that
distance learning providers be authorized in each state in which
they offer courses.81 Next, this Part outlines state authorization
requirements for distance learning providers and provides an
https://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/disputes/prepare (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
See also About the FSA Ombudsman, FED. STUDENT AID (Mar. 28, 2012, 7:35
PM), https://ombudsman.ed.gov/about/about.html#whereelsetogo (providing the
complaint form for students with grievances).
78
Harnisch, supra note 7, at 8.
79
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“There is no
doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education.”).
80
34 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2010). The D.C. Circuit overruled portions of the
Program Integrity Rules in Ass'n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan,
681 F.3d 427, 461–463 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
81
34 C.F.R. § 600.9(c) (2010).
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overview of the three main criteria states use to determine whether
a distance learning provider must become authorized in that state.
Finally, this Part introduces the complexities created by the 2010
federal regulations and the varying requirements for state
authorization.
A. Federal Oversight
In October 2010, the U.S. Department of Education released an
amendment explaining the Online State Authorization Rule of the
Program Integrity Rules, a component of the Higher Education
Act.82 The Online State Authorization Rule requires institutions
offering online programs to obtain approval in each state in which
they operate, or else risk losing Title IV federal funding.83 Whether
an institution may offer distance or correspondence education in a
particular state is a matter of widely varying state laws. In essence,
for those institutions dependent on Title IV funding, this new rule
results in federal oversight of state higher education licensing for
institutions.84 Due to a procedural violation, the Department of
Education does not currently enforce the Online State

82

Id. § 600.9.
Id. § 600.9. Title IV funding is the federal financial aid programs
authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act, and is regulated and
administered by the U.S. Department of Education. REBECCA R. SKINNER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INSTITUTIONAL ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN
TITLE IV STUDENT AID PROGRAMS UNDER THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT:
BACKGROUND AND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES, RL33909 (2007), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33909_20070309.pdf.
83

84

To give states and distance-education programs “some
breathing room,” the Department will give colleges until July
1, 2014, to obtain all necessary state approvals, so long as they
are making a “good faith effort” to do so before then, an
administration official told reporters on Wednesday. Evidence
of such an effort could include an application to a state or
documentation from a state that an application is pending,
among other actions.
Kelly Field, Colleges Get More Time to Comply with New Rule on State
Authorization,
CHRON.
HIGHER
EDUC.
(Apr.
20,
2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Get-More-Time-to/127216/.
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Authorization Rule, but it has indicated that it will reintroduce the
rule in 2015.85
B. State Oversight
State regulations are generally place-based; thus, distance
learning by its very nature presents challenges for state governance
because it crosses state lines. States may be reluctant to regulate
universities based in other states, or may not have data regarding
the enrollment of their residents in out-of-state distance learning
programs.
State authorization requirements for higher education
institutions also vary greatly. The Online State Authorization Rule
has brought into sharp focus this wide variation in state
authorization requirements.86 For example, states vary as to
whether a higher education institution is required to be authorized
in a state in order to offer distance learning courses to that state’s
residents, and the process through which higher education
institutions become authorized varies by state.
There are, however, several trends in how states determine
whether an institution requires authorization in order to operate
within the state. States tend to use one of three common models to
85

In 2012, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Online State
Authorization Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it failed
to provide adequate notice of the rule to regulated parties. See Ass'n of Private
Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d at 461–63. However, the
Department of Education has indicated that it will reintroduce the Online State
Authorization Rule, as evidenced by the Online State Authorization Rule’s
inclusion in the Department of Education’s Program Integrity and Improvement
Negotiated Rulemaking. Negotiated Rulemaking 2013-2014: Program Integrity
and Improvement, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/policy/
highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/programintegrity.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2015). It is widely believed by those involved in the higher education industry
and in the Negotiated Rulemaking that the reintroduction of this legislation will
occur sometime in 2015. Email interview with Alan Contreras, State
Authorization Reciprocity Agreement Coordinator, National Council/WICHE
(Oct. 27, 2014) (on file with author).
86
See generally EDUVENTURES, ONLINE LEARNING ACROSS STATE
BORDERS: ASSESSING STATE REGULATION OF OUT-OF-STATE SCHOOLS 11
(2011) (providing an overview of the state regulation of out-of-state schools
with regard to online learning, recruitment, and institution licensing volume).
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regulate distance learning: (1) the physical presence model; (2) the
online explicit model; and (3) the exemption model.87 Each of
these models is discussed in turn below. The wide variation among
models provides a window into the complex regulatory regime and
the need for standardization.
1. The Physical Presence Model
A majority of states will look to “physical presence” within the
state, or whether a state is “operating” within the state, in order to
determine whether to regulate a private postsecondary distance
learning institution.88 The terms used to describe physical presence
vary considerably among states. Some states, such as Kansas89 and
Missouri, explicitly define the term. Missouri defines “operate” as
“to establish, keep, or maintain any facility at a location or
locations in this state where, from, or through which education is
offered or given and shall include contracting with any person,
group, or entity to perform any such act.”90 In contrast, South
Dakota does not define physical presence; it merely notes that “no
postsecondary institution may provide educational programs at
87

See id. at 11–14 (categorizing states into these three models, along with a
fourth, “online ambiguous”).
88
See id. at 10 (depicting a chart which indicates that in 2011, fifty-five
percent of states utilize a physical presence model).
89
For example, the Kansas Board of Regents requires a Certificate of
Approval that must be renewed annually for “all schools operating with a
physical presence in Kansas or that are actively soliciting enrollment of
prospective students to receive instruction in the state of Kansas.” Private/Outof-State, KAN. BD. OF REGENTS, http://www.kansasregents.org/academic
_affairs/private_out_of_state (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). The Kansas Board of
Regents further defines active solicitation as
trying to attract students to enroll in a course (who will remain
in Kansas while taking the course) by doing things like
placing ads in Kansas papers or running ads on Kansas based
TV or Radio stations, student recruitment, or engaging in other
means of solicitation that specifically contacts or targets
Kansas residents in order to encourage them to enroll in a outof-state postsecondary school that is offering a certificate,
diploma or degree.
Id.
90
MO. REV. STAT. § 173.600 (2013).
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physical locations in South Dakota unless” the institution receives
authorization.91
Moreover, states differ in how they define the physical
presence requirement. For example, the Kansas Board of Regents
interprets statutorily-defined physical presence to include both a
physical building and solicitation that contacts or targets Kansas
residents.92 In contrast, the Nebraska physical presence
requirement is defined as establishing an administrative office or
mailing address in Nebraska, or offering within the state a course
for college credit or a degree program.93 Institutions that market to
Nebraska students, but do not meet the aforementioned criteria, do
not require authorization to operate in Nebraska. Marshall Hill
advocates Nebraska’s physical presence model and finds the more
expansive physical presence model to be impractical and overly
burdensome on states.94
2. The Online Explicit Model
Some states have explicit regulatory language that suggests
jurisdiction, rather than online instruction, as the basis for
regulation. For example, Arkansas’s application for postsecondary
degree programs to offer courses in Arkansas notes that “any nonpublic or out-of-state postsecondary education institution offering
course/degree programs customarily offered at colleges and
universities must obtain certification from the Arkansas Higher
Education Coordinating Board before offering distance delivery
college-level course/degree programs to Arkansas students.”95
91

State Authorization Regulations for Postsecondary Education, S.D. BD.
REGENTS, http://www.sdbor.edu/mediapubs/StateApproval.htm (last visited
Feb. 16, 2015).
92
KAN. BD. OF REGENTS, supra note 89.
93
This includes establishing a location for “synchronous or asynchronous
instruction” or requiring students to “physically meet in one location for
instructional purposes more than once during the course term.” 281 N EB .
A DMIN . C ODE , ch.7 § 003.05, available at http://www.ccpe.state.ne.us/
PublicDoc/Ccpe/Rules/pdf/chapter7.pdf. See also generally Legal and
Regulatory, NEB. COORDINATING COMM’N FOR POSTSECONDARY EDUC. (Apr.
17, 2012), http://www.ccpe.state.ne.us/PublicDoc/Ccpe/LegalRegs/default.asp.
94
Hill Interview, supra note 15.
95
ARK. DEP’T OF HIGHER EDUC., APPLICATION FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF
OF
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Similarly, under Alabama state law, the Alabama Commission on
Higher Education has jurisdiction over “non-resident institutions
defined as postsecondary institutions or corporations offering
educational programs in Alabama with main campuses or
headquarters located outside the state.”96
3. The Exemption Model
A minority of states, including California,97 use an exemption
model that allows out-of-state institutions to rely on regional and
sometimes national accreditation rather than the independent
licensure of the state.98 Utah, for example, does not require out-ofstate schools “accredited by a regional or national accrediting
agency recognized by the Department of Education” to seek
registration in the state.99 Other states that follow a similar model
include Alaska, Colorado, Delaware and Hawaii.100
C. Problems and Complexities Created by the Federal
Online State Authorization Rule
The federal Online State Authorization Rule is problematic for
both institutions and students. Procuring authorization to operate in
multiple states can be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming
for institutions enrolling distance learning students. Very few
institutions other than large for-profits “ever considered that they
might need each state’s approval in advance should someone from
that state happen to join their online program,” and as a result,
most were unprepared for the complex state authorization
COLLEGE-LEVEL COURSE/DEGREE PROGRAMS AT ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS
(DISTANCE DELIVERY) 2 (2005), available at http://www.adhe.edu/
SiteCollectionDocuments/AcademicAffairsDivision/ICAC%20Rules%20and%2
0Regulations/rules_part1sec2_011609.pdf.
96
Non-Resident Institutions, A LA . C OMM ’ N ON H IGHER E DUC .,
http://www.ache.alabama.gov/Content/Departments/NRI/NRI.aspx (last visited
Feb. 16, 2015). The Alabama code that the Commission on Higher Education
bases its regulations on is ALA. CODE §16-5-10(14) (1975).
97
See infra Part III.A.
98
EDUVENTURES, supra note 86, at 11.
99
Utah Postsecondary Proprietary School Act §13-34-105(1)(e) (2014).
100
EDUVENTURES, supra note 86, at 11.
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process.101 Institutions may need to deal with more than one
authorizing body within a state to procure authorization to operate
in that state.102 As a result, a joint survey by two education
associations indicated that, in July 2011, “sixty-nine percent of
institutions [had] yet to apply for approval in any state.”103 Some
institutions indicated that they lacked the funds necessary to
address state compliance.104
Moreover, large for-profit institutions are more likely than
other types of universities to have the staffing and financial
resources necessary to navigate the complex state authorization
web, while smaller or nonprofit institutions may not.105 In addition,
many states had not considered out-of-state distance learning
programs, and as result had neither the regulations in place nor the
resources to accept and process an influx of applications.106
Lastly, the requirement for state authorization can also harm
students. A survey of institutions in early 2011 indicated that fiftynine percent of institutions anticipated not accepting students from
certain states.107 If institutions decide not to seek state approval in
certain states, students in those states will be unable to enroll in
these institutions. This is especially problematic for those students
who hope to enroll in distance education programs that serve niche
markets, such as Bismarck North Dakota State College’s program
for the energy industry or American Academy McCallister

101

Jay Halfond, Unintended Consequences: An Uncertain Future for
Distance Learning, NEW ENG. J. HIGHER EDUC., June 9, 2011,
http://www.nebhe.org/thejournal/unintended-consequences-an-uncertain-futurefor-distance-learning/.
102
Hill Interview, supra note 15.
103
What Are Institutions Doing (or NOT Doing) About State
Authorization?, WCET ADVANCE (Aug. 18, 2011), http://wcet.wiche.edu/
advance/upcea-wcet-sa-survey. The survey was conducted by University
Professional & Continuing Education Association (UPCEA) and WICHE
Cooperative for Educational Technologies. Id.
104
Id.
105
In fact, many institutions not in compliance with the State Authorization
Rule are established, not-for-profit institutions. See Harnisch supra note 7, at 9.
106
Halfond, supra note 101.
107
WCET ADVANCE, supra note 103.
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Institute’s program for funeral study, since it may be difficult to
find a comparable program elsewhere in the United States.108
Perhaps even more problematically, the wide range of state
regulatory models along with the complexity of state requirements
create barriers for distance learning students who seek recourse for
issues they encounter with higher education institutions. Students
may have difficulty determining which state has authority over
their complaint, or which state laws are applicable. Students may
get “passed back and forth” between higher education regulatory
agencies of different states.109 Furthermore, students with a
complaint who are located in a state that exempts accredited higher
education institutions from state education laws may have little or
no recourse for any difficulties they encounter with a higher
education institution which is also based in an exempt state.
III.

STATE REGULATORY MODELS COMPARED

The wide variation in state regulatory models results in
different regulatory schemes with which educational institutions
must comply in order to become authorized to offer distance
education in that state. Part III provides a comparison between two
states with widely divergent processes for state authorization. This
Part first outlines California’s notoriously lax oversight of higher
education institutions. It next details Ohio’s authorization process.
It concludes by comparing the two models.
A. California—Lax Oversight
The difficulties that higher education students face, as outlined
in Part II.C, are especially pronounced in California. California’s
exemption model results in lax oversight of higher education
institutions in the state, creating a problematic regulatory structure
that adversely affects both traditional classroom and distance
learning students.
108

Russel Poulin & Jim Fong, Putting a Student Face on the State
Authorization Regulation, CAMPUS TECHNOLOGY (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://campustechnology.com/Articles/2011/08/24/Putting-a-Student-Face-onthe-State-Authorization-Regulation.aspx?Page=1.
109
Hill Interview, supra note 15.
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Furthermore, the for-profit industry in California is particularly
active, prompting even greater concern regarding the regulatory
structure in the state. For-profit universities enroll more than a
quarter of California’s undergraduate students.110 Students at
California’s for-profit universities experience many of the same
issues facing students enrolled at for-profit universities across the
country, but often to a greater degree. For example, sixty-seven
percent of the state’s student loan defaulters attended a for-profit
university even though for-profit universities awarded only twenty
percent of all degrees and certificates.111 In comparison, the
national rate of student loan defaulters who attended for-profit
universities is forty-seven percent.112
1.

The Bureau
Education

for

Private

Postsecondary

Postsecondary education in California is governed by the
California Private Postsecondary Education Act of 2009 (“the
Act”), which established a Bureau for Private Postsecondary
Education within the Department of Consumer Affairs (“the
Bureau”).113 Currently, the Bureau oversees higher education

110

California Oversight of Private Postsecondary Education: Joint
Oversight Hearing Before Assembly Higher Educ. Comm. and Senate Bus.,
Professions and Econ. Dev. Comm., 2012 Leg., 197th Sess. (Cal. 2012)
[hereinafter Joint Hearing], available at http://www.ticas.org/files/pub/
Debbie_Cochrane_testimony_2-14-12.pdf.
111
Liz Guillen, Fact Sheet: California’s Oversight of Private
Postsecondary
Schools,
PUBLIC
ADVOCATES
(Feb.
14,
2012),
http://www.publicadvocates.org/document/fact-sheet-californias-oversight-ofprivate-postsecondary-schools.
112
Joint Hearing, supra note 110 (Testimony of Debbie Cochrane,
Program Director, The Institute for College Access & Success). Additionally,
California’s for-profit universities also disproportionately enroll students of
color. Guillen, supra note 111. African-American and Latino students comprise
thirty-seven percent of California undergraduates but represent fifty-seven
percent of those attending for-profit universities. Id. In comparison, AfricanAmerican and Latino students comprise twenty-eight percent of U.S.
undergraduate students, but represent approximately half of all students in the
for-profit sector. Id.
113
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94800–94950 (West 2013).
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institutions in the state. The Bureau oversees three categories of
higher education institutions: (1) unaccredited institutions; (2)
nationally accredited institutions; and (3) regionally accredited
institutions.114
The Bureau has full authority only over unaccredited
institutions.115 Unaccredited institutions must meet standards that
the Bureau sets forth, including meeting minimum standards to
obtain approval to operate, complying with fair business practices,
and submitting enrollment agreement and disclosure
requirements.116 Unaccredited institutions are also subject to the
Bureau’s investigation, complaint and enforcement procedures.117
Nationally accredited schools are automatically approved to
operate in the state, but must still comply with some requirements
outlined in the Act, including the Bureau’s fair business practice,
enrollment agreement, and disclosure requirements.118 These

114

Id.
Joint Hearing, supra note 110 (testimony of Jamienne S. Studley,
President
&
CEO,
Public
Advocates
Inc.),
available
at
http://www.publicadvocates.org/sites/default/files/library/jsshearingtestimony02
-14-12.pdf [hereinafter Studley Testimony].
116
Id. at 6. The “minimum operating standards for an institution” include
that “(a) the content of each educational program can achieve its stated
objective; (b) the institution maintains specific written standards for student
admissions . . . ; (c) the facilities . . . are sufficient to enable students to achieve
the educational program’s goals.” CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94885 (West 2014).
Disclosure requirements might include disclosures of known limitations of a
degree program, for example, whether “a graduate of the program will be
eligible to sit for the applicable licensure exam in California and other states.”
2011 Legis. Bill Hist. CA A.B. 2296 (2012) (Lexis).
117
Studley Testimony, supra note 115. The Bureau has a spotty track record
of actually overseeing postsecondary institutions in California. An investigation
by the Bay Citizen (a nonprofit news organization committed to investigative
reporting) revealed that the Bureau “had a backlog of some two hundred
investigations of “schools accused of hiring unqualified faculty members,
providing degrees of dubious value and other violations of state education
code.” Jennifer Gollan, At Vocational Schools, Complaints Mount as Oversight
Lags, THE BAY CITIZEN (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.baycitizen.org/news/
education/vocational-schools-complaints-mount-lags/.
118
Studley Testimony, supra note 115, at 6 (citing EDUC. § 94890).
115
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institutions are also subject to the Bureau’s investigation,
complaint, and enforcement procedures.119
In contrast, regionally accredited institutions are exempt from
the majority of the Bureau’s provisions and are not required to
comply with the state’s statutory and regulatory requirements.120
Private postsecondary institutions with regional accreditation must
still apply to the Bureau for Private Postsecondary Education.121
However, the application is only two pages and requests only basic
information about the institution.122
California’s exemption of regionally accredited higher
education institutions is particularly problematic. Notably,
regionally accredited schools are not required to establish that they
meet the Bureau’s minimum operating standards or follow the
consumer protection standards outlined in the Act.123 Further, for
higher education institutions that do require authorization in
California, the Bureau has historically been lax about ensuring that
these schools have approval to operate in the state.124

119

Id.
Id. Regionally accredited schools must comply with the Bureau’s
provisions that require an institution to provide records to the Bureau before
closing and with provisions governing payments and procedures related to the
Student Tuition Recovery Fund. Id. n.18 (citing EDUC. §§ 94927.5, 94874.1,
94923–94925).
121
CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 5, §71390 (2010).
122
The application consists of two pages that primarily require basic
information about the institution, contact person, and owners of the school, a
copy of current verification of accreditation, and a $750 nonrefundable fee.
Application for Approval to Operate an Accredited Institution, BUREAU FOR
PRIVATE POST-SECONDARY EDUC., http://www.bppe.ca.gov/forms_pubs/
approval_accredited.pdf (providing the application form).
123
As a result of this gap in oversight, 266,538 undergraduate students at
154 schools in California attend institutions not approved or overseen by the
Bureau. See Studley Testimony, supra note 115, at 7.
124
Jennifer Golan, More Than 130 Vocational Schools Are Operating
Without
State
Approval,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
5,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/us/california-vocational-schools-operatingwithout-approval.html?pagewanted=all. In April 2012, up to 10 percent of
California’s approved private postsecondary institutions were permitted to
operate with expired approvals. Id. Despite their expired approvals, the schools
were nonetheless listed on the Bureau’s website as approved schools. Id.
120
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Thus, California in essence relies on regional accreditation
agencies to ensure the quality of a majority of its higher education
institutions. This heavy reliance on just one branch of the
regulatory triad leads to poor oversight of institutions in the state.
Moreover, as discussed above, accrediting agencies are not
designed to handle student complaints.125 Thus, students attending
a regionally accredited institution in California have little recourse
within the state’s consumer protection framework for complaints
of fraud, misrepresentation, or other actions.126
2.

Assembly Bill 2296 and Other Improvements

California has recently worked toward improving its oversight
of for-profit college and vocational school performance. Chapter
585 of California’s Education Code, in effect since January 2013,
requires institutions regulated by California’s Bureau for Private
Postsecondary Education to report certain performance
measures.127 These measures include salaries of recent graduates
and the percentages of student borrowers who have defaulted on
their loans and percentage of students receiving federal student
loans.128 The statute also requires unaccredited institutions to
disclose to students their accreditation status and the accreditation
status of specific programs.129 While these improvements are a step
125

Interview with Betsy Imholz, Director of Special Projects, Consumers
Union (Apr. 18, 2012) (notes on file with author). “Many people in the field
think accreditation agencies are being burdened with issues beyond their reach.
Accreditors have neither the staff nor the legal authority to conduct actual
investigations. And accreditation reviewers are volunteers, usually from peer
institutions, who are experts in higher education but not corporate malfeasance.”
Eric Kelderman, Online Programs Face New Demands from Accreditors,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 6, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/OnlinePrograms-Face-New/129608/.
126
Studley Testimony, supra note 115, at 16.
127
2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 585 (A.B. 2296) (West).
128
New California Law Requires Greater Disclosure of For-Profit College
and Vocational School Performance, PUB. ADVOCATES (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.publicadvocates.org/press-releases/new-california-law-requiresgreater-disclosure-of-for-profit-college-and-vocational-s.
129
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94897(p)(1)-(3), amended by 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv.
Ch. 585 (A.B. 2296) (West).
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in the right direction, the Bureau does not pursue violators who
operate without state approval, and the new legislation does not
provide a mechanism for increased enforcement. Consequently, if
a higher education institution in California does not comply with
Chapter 585, the Bureau does not have the authority to compel it to
do so.130
Despite the recent improvements to California’s oversight of
higher education institutions, the state’s flawed regulatory structure
poses many challenges in the distance learning context. For
example, a California student taking courses from a regionally
accredited out-of-state higher education institution will have little
recourse within the consumer protection framework of the state.
Likewise, an out-of-state student enrolled in a distance learning
course or program based in California will encounter similar
difficulties finding recourse.
B. Ohio—Rigorous Oversight
In contrast to California’s lax approach, some states impose
much stricter requirements on educational institutions. Ohio is one
such state. In particular, the Chancellor and the Ohio Board of
Regents (“the Board”) have the authority to approve and review all
institutions that operate in Ohio, and Ohio’s approval process
involves a thorough review of the educational programs that higher
education institutions propose.131
The primary trigger that causes an institution to require
authorization to operate in Ohio is when the institution offers
instruction within the state. If the institution has a physical
presence in Ohio, then it must also apply for state authorization.
Accordingly, the most likely candidates for state authorization
include in-state institutions, for-profit out-of-state schools, and

130

Michael Coleman, Chapter 585: A Renewed Effort to Restore Integrity
to California’s Vocational and Postsecondary Educational Institutions, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 608, 618–19 (2013) (providing an in-depth analysis of
Chapter 585’s changes to the California Education Code and their likely
impact).
131
Interview with Shane DeGarmo, Program Approval/Institutional
Authorization, Ohio Bd. of Regents (Oct. 18, 2012) [hereinafter DeGarmo
Interview] (notes on file with author).
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established off-site schools that offer education in Ohio. As a
result, the Board has authority over the approval of institutions that
award diplomas, offer instruction in certain enumerated fields, or
simply offer courses.132 Institutions that provide distance education
to Ohio residents must also apply for state authorization if their
online program contains a component such as an internship,
student teaching opportunity, or clinical experience that a student
completes in Ohio.133 Further, solicitation or direct recruitment of
Ohio residents through mail or agents triggers the authorization
process.134
132

This requirement is pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Title XVII, Chapter
1713.01 and 1713.02:
As used in sections 1713.01 to 1713.06 of the Revised Code,
‘institution’ includes:
(A) Any nonprofit university, college, academy, school, or
other institution, incorporated or unincorporated, that does any
of the following:
(1) Awards or intends to award diplomas for the completion of
a course designed to prepare students to be eligible for
certification as registered nurses;
(2) Offers or intends to offer instruction in the arts and
sciences, teacher education, business administration,
engineering, philosophy, literature, fine arts, law, medicine,
nursing, social work, theology and other recognized academic
and professional fields of study, and awards or intends to
award degrees for fulfilling requirements of academic work
beyond high school;
(3) Offers or intends to offer a course or courses in any of the
areas described by division (A)(1) or (2) of this section that
are applicable to requirements for a diploma or degree named
in either such division.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1713.01(A) (West 2013). The Ohio Revised Code
(which governs program approval) also applies to “any college, university, or
school that offers or intends to offer one or more courses . . . that is operated by
another state or a subdivision or other governmental entity of another state.” Id.
§ 1713.01(B).
133
DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131.
134
For out-of-state institutions offering distance education programs, state
authorization is required if “the institution maintains a brick and mortar presence
in Ohio; the online program contains a component (e.g. student teaching, clinical
placement, practicum) that will be completed in Ohio; or the institution solicits
Ohio residents for its programs (for-profit institutions only).” Academic
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Ohio’s current model for state authorization consists of an
involved review process. Schools seeking authorization in Ohio
must complete template forms and submit a first-time application
fee and a fee to cover the cost of review.135 Schools must then
begin developing program proposals, which are subject to approval
by the Board.136 The Board only begins the review process once
the institution has submitted its program proposals.137
In reviewing a proposal, the Board assembles a team with the
appropriate expertise needed to review the proposed program. For
example, teams may have experts to assess library resources, and
may also have experts geared towards certain subject matter, or
with a more general expertise in the case of undergraduate
programs.138 The review generally takes place over a three-week
period and includes a site visit and meetings with the institution’s
president, chief academic and financial officers, faculty, librarians,
and student support personnel.139
The review team also creates a report, which it shares with the
institution on the final morning of the site visit.140 The institution
drafts a response to the team’s report, which it sends back to the
Board.141 If the school is approved, the Board will write a
summary of the request, provide a ten-day public comment
period,142 and then pass the request to the Chancellor for review
and approval.143
As a result of the 2010 Online State Authorization Rule, Ohio
is now in the process of creating a new process to deal with the

Program Approval, OHIO HIGHER ED, https://www.ohiohighered.org/academicprogram-approval (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
135
DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
For a list of current proposals posted awaiting public comments, see
Proposals Posted for Public Comment or Awaiting the Chancellor’s Signature,
OHIO
HIGHER
E D,
https://www.ohiohighered.org/academic-programapproval/programs-pending (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
143
DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131.
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influx of requests resulting from the state authorization
requirements.144 The Board recognized that the academic program
approval process is time-consuming and complex for both the
institutions and the Board.145 The Board is thus introducing a new,
streamlined approval process. This process will involve verifying
that an institution has appropriate approval from its home state and
will ask institutions to verify their accreditation status, among
other steps. The new process will reduce the approval time from
twelve to twenty months down to nine.146
Ohio’s approach also affords consumer protection to students.
For the consumer protection of students who are Ohio residents,
the Board’s approach depends on the type of institution involved in
the consumer’s complaint. For example, if the complaint stems
from a student’s relationship with a nonprofit institution, the Board
records basic information about the complaint if it is also an issue
that is normally handled through the institution’s grievance
procedures.147 In these cases, if the Board believes that the issue is
one that can be addressed through the institution’s grievance
procedures, then the Board will encourage the student to work
through those avenues.148 On the other hand, if the complaint
relates to an issue directly relating to Ohio’s program approval
process, (for example, an alleged violation of an actual
144

Ohio received approximately 900 applications following the passage of
the 2010 State Authorization Rule. Id.
145
Id.
146
Regents Team Overhauls Key Review Process to Quicken Turnaround
and
Ensure
Quality,
LEAN
OHIO
(Mar.
16,
2012),
http://lean.ohio.gov/Results/BoardofRegentsProgramApprovalMarch2012.aspx.
The new process also reduces the number of steps required to gain state
authorization in Ohio by 65 percent (from 175 steps to 62 steps). Id. Institutions
will have a single point of entry to apply for state authorization, will be able to
compare Ohio’s standards with those of their home state, and will have a mentor
at the state agency who will serve as a single contact point throughout the
program approval process. Id. For the Board, this streamlined process is
projected to save the state $2500 per institution reviewed. Id. Further, the new
system will have a centralized information management system that will allow
staff the ability to quickly and easily retrieve information on past interactions
with an institution. Id.
147
DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131.
148
Id.
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requirement of the approval process) then the Board will likely
take a more corrective stance and communicate directly with the
institution.149
For student complaints related to for-profit institutions, the
Board advises students to take complaints to the State Board of
Career Colleges and Schools (the “State Board”).150 The State
Board “monitors and regulates Ohio’s private post-secondary
career colleges and schools to ensure compliance with minimum
standards” established by Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3332, which
covers careers colleges and schools.151 It allows students to file
complaints against registered schools.152 In response to a
complaint, the State Board conducts an initial investigation of the
complaint to determine if a violation occurred.153 Upon such a
finding, the State Board “may issue a formal complaint or it may
endeavor to eliminate such practices by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”154
If a student complaint results from a distance education
program that has an experiential component (for example, student
teaching, clinical placement, or practicum) that will be completed
in Ohio, the Board has different approaches depending on the
student complaint.155 For example, if the student has an issue with
the degree program offered by the out-of-state institution, but not
with the experiential component, the student will be directed to the
appropriate higher education authority in that institution’s home
state.156 However, if the complaint arises from the experiential

149

Id.
Id.
151
O HIO R EV . C ODE A NN . § 3332.01 (West 2014); About Us – General
Information, OHIO STATE BD. OF CAREER COLLS. & SCHS., http://scr.ohio.gov/
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
152
Filing a Complaint, OHIO STATE BD. OF CAREER COLLS. & SCHS.,
http://scr.ohio.gov/ConsumerInformation/FilingaComplaint.aspx (last visited
Feb. 16, 2015).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131.
156
Id.
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component, the Board will investigate and attempt to resolve the
complaint.157
C. Comparative Analysis of California’s and Ohio’s
Regulatory Structures
California’s exemption model results in a lax oversight
structure that relies solely on the accrediting agency prong of the
regulatory triad as a means of state authorization. In contrast,
Ohio’s authorization process, in both its current and proposed
form, is significantly more robust.
A comparison between the two systems highlights the huge
variance in regulatory standards. Ohio’s more stringent
authorization process renders it more likely that in-state institutions
will offer a higher quality education. In contrast, California’s
system does not ensure a high quality education for its students.
California’s exemption model means that most higher education
institutions in the state are not subject to the entirety of
California’s regulatory authority, but can achieve state
authorization through only regional accreditation. The widely
variant state authorization processes and consumer protection
standards in each state highlight the need for a comprehensive
regulatory scheme that simplifies the state authorization process
while adequately protecting the interests of student consumers.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Part first outlines the genesis of regional interstate
compacts and current efforts to recruit states into these compacts in
order to deal with the regulatory problems discussed in Part II.
This Part next explores flaws with the regional interstate compacts.
Finally, it proposes an improved regulatory scheme that ties Title
IV federal funding to adequate consumer protection mechanisms in
states, thereby providing student consumers with sufficient
recourse against their higher education institutions.

157

Id.
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A. Regional Interstate Compacts

A promising avenue for change in the industry is the creation
of interstate compacts, which are agreements among two or more
states, enacted into law in each state, and designed to address a
common problem. The Presidents’ Forum, a collaboration of
accredited national institutions engaged in distance learning, began
the process of creating an interstate compact in 2010.158 The
Forum’s objectives mainly focus on reducing impediments to the
spread of online education.159 The Forum identified the structural
impediments in state regulatory processes as a main roadblock to
online education.160 The Forum critiqued state approval processes
as inhibiting institutions from offering regional or national distance
learning.161 Specifically, the Forum cited the inability of distance
learning institutions to afford the “considerable staff and resources
necessary to respond individually to each of the fifty states’
requirements.”162 Given the differing approaches to state
regulations, the Forum proposed a cooperative national effort to
effect change in this area.163
In September 2010, the Forum convened state authorization
officials and representatives from the Council on State
Governments (“CSG”)164 to create a Multi-State Reciprocity Task
Team (“Task Team”).165 The Task Team reviewed the current state
158

PAUL H. SHIFFMAN, JAMES W. HALL, & ALAN L. CONTRERAS, TOWARD
MODEL TEMPLATE UPON WHICH AN INTERSTATE RECIPROCITY COMPACT OF
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION COULD BE BASED: A
WHITE PAPER OF THE PRESIDENTS’ FORUM 1 (2011), available at
https://confluence.umassonline.net/download/attachments/62523168/SARA_To
ward_A_Model_Template.pdf.
159
Id. at 3.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 6.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 7 (“The Council on State Governments . . . is a non-partisan,
nonprofit organization that represents every elected and appointed official in the
three branches of state government in the fifty states and U.S. territories[,
which] offers guidance and technical assistance in dealing with interstate
compacts and other interstate agreements.”).
165
Id.
A
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regulatory approval procedures and the “processes and institutional
data that states indicate are necessary in order to validate the
credibility of an institution for the purpose of granting authority to
operate in a state.”166 The CSG concluded that in order to promote
reciprocal strategies among states, its regulatory authorization
officials needed to create and define a common template, policy,
and enforcement strategy that was closely aligned with the need for
review and revision of state regulations.167 The CSG then drafted a
model interstate compact.168
The proposed model interstate compact depends on regional
interstate compacts that the four regional higher education
organizations have already created: the Western Interstate
Commission for Higher Education (“WICHE”), the New England
Board of Higher Education, the Midwestern Higher Education
Compact, and the Southern Regional Education Board. These
higher education organizations encourage resource sharing and
facilitate action among higher education systems.169 Currently, the
four regional higher education organizations are creating distinct
interstate compacts and enlisting the states within their jurisdiction
to join.170 Authorization by one of the four regional interstate
compacts would provide a higher education institution with the
ability to operate in all states in that compact.171
The Commission on the Regulation of Postsecondary Distance
Education (“the Commission”) builds upon the work of the Forum
and the CSG.172 The Commission was established to “develop and
166
167
168

Id.
Id.
Interview with Alan Contreras, Member, Presidents’ Forum (Apr. 18,

2012).
169

ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 17.
See id. These four regional organizations are typically referred to as
compacts, but for the sake of clarity will be referred to as organizations
throughout this Article.
171
ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 17.
172
The Commission is composed of former U.S. Secretary of Education
Richard Riley and twenty other higher education leaders invited by the
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities and the State Higher
Education Executive Officers to “explore the regulation of postsecondary
distance education.” Id. at 3. The Commission was convened in May 2012 to
“develop and provide recommendations that will address the costs and
170
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provide recommendations that will address the costs and
inefficiencies faced by postsecondary institutions that must comply
with multiple (often inconsistent) state laws and regulations.”173
The four regional higher education organizations will use the
Commission’s policy paper as a guide for creating four distinct
regional interstate compacts.174
The Commission expanded upon the work of the CSG and the
Forum in its 2013 policy paper, Advancing Access Through
Regulatory Reform.175 The paper focused on using the four
regional higher education organizations to create distinct regional
interstate compacts, overseen by a national coordinating board.176
The paper emphasized the importance of accreditation and
institutional quality, consumer protection, and institutional
financial responsibility.177
The regional interstate compacts create a comprehensive set of
standards for higher education institutions; the goal of the creators
of the compacts is to implement standards that will appeal to a
broad spectrum of states, including those with the most rigorous
standards for higher education institutions.178 In order to join the
inefficiencies faced by postsecondary institutions that must comply with
multiple (often inconsistent) state laws and regulations as they endeavor to
provide educational opportunities to students in multiple state jurisdictions.” Id.
173
Id.
174
Interview with Alan Contreras, State Authorization Reciprocity
Agreement Coordinator, National Council/WICHE (Oct. 8, 2013). I spoke with
Alan Contreras several times in the course of my research. His job title has
changed since my first conversation with him—the citations reflect his job title
at the time of the interview.
175
ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 1.
176
Id. at 4. The paper discusses that the regional higher education compacts
are “well-positioned to manage state participation in the agreement since they
have strong, existing relationships with states and institutions and [have]
demonstrated experience in managing interstate activities.” Id.
177
Id. at 4–5. The Commission’s decision to use the four existing regional
higher education organizations rather than create a single national structure was
based in part on the belief that creating an entirely new national structure would
be “too time- and resource-intensive and potentially too bureaucratic to be
viable.” Id.
178
Interview with Alan Contreras, Member, Presidents’ Forum (Apr. 18,
2012). A template of a model interstate compact provides an overview of
categories and areas that the interstate compact will address. These include (1)
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regional interstate compacts, a state must take on the obligation of
overseeing institutions located within its boundaries and will have
the authority to oversee the “in-state activities of institutions that
have physical presence in its borders.”179 Physical presence is
defined as the “ongoing occupation of an actual physical location
for instructional purposes or the maintenance of an administrative
office to facilitate instruction in the state.”180 As of August 2014,
nine states have joined regional interstate compacts: three states in
the Midwest region and six states in the Western region. Joining
one of the regional interstate compacts indicates that the state has
adopted the appropriate legislation to facilitate compliance with the
requirements of the interstate compact.181
Successful regional interstate compacts will provide higher
education institutions with solutions to many of the problems that
were outlined in Part II.C. If enough states join regional interstate
compacts, this will reduce the need for higher education
institutions to acquire authorization in each state in which they
Institutional Status: Charter, Regional Accreditation, State Approvals; (2)
Leadership, Governance and Management; (3) Faculty Qualifications; (4)
Curricula; (5) Credit Award; (6) Admissions; (7) Student Services; (8)
Institutional Information, Marketing, Recruitment; (9) Registrar services and
Student records; (10) Institutional Operational and Student Outcome Data; (11)
Finances, Tuition and Fees; and (12) Institutional Infrastructure in Support of
Student Study. Id.
179
ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 17–18. One of the most tangible
benefits to states that will result from joining the compacts will be a reduced
number of applications from higher education institutions. However, this
decrease in time and resources spent processing applications will be
accompanied by a reduction in fees generated from these applications. Interview
with Alan Contreras (Oct. 8, 2013), supra note 174.
180
ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 15. Further, “[f]or purposes of
the interstate reciprocity agreement, institutions delivering pure distance
education courses and conducting no other activities in a state should not be
deemed to be physically present.” Id.
181
ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 18. The National Council for
State Reciprocity Agreements provides an updated list on the state-level process
for introducing and passing cogent legislation. Alan Contreras Interview with
Alan Contreras (Oct. 8, 2013), supra note 174. The states in the Western region
that have joined are Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and
Washington. Id. The states in the Midwestern region are Indiana, Nebraska, and
North Dakota. Id.
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offer distance learning courses, thereby lessening their regulatory
burden.182
B. The Compacts and Consumer Protection
A key issue facing the interstate compact model is whether
states with widely differing regulatory standards can belong to the
same compact, especially given their potentially differing
standards for consumer protection. Under the current proposal, a
higher education institution will be subject to the state regulatory
authority of one state—the state in which it is based. Thus, the
state in which the institution is based will deal with any consumer
protection issues. In order to join a regional interstate compact, a
state will be required to have a mechanism in place to receive,
respond to, and resolve student complaints.183 For example, if both
Nebraska and Oregon are members of an interstate compact and an
Oregon higher education institution provides a distance learning
course to a Nebraska resident, then the Nebraska student’s
complaint would be directed to Oregon’s state consumer protection
agency.184 This mechanism is necessary in order to ensure that
students have a clear avenue for the resolution of any complaints
and that states are adequately prepared to deal with any issues that
might arise at an institution located within its boundaries.
The regional interstate compact model thus raises a number of
issues relating to states’ consumer protection frameworks. One
issue is whether states with subpar consumer protection laws will
be permitted to enter the regional interstate compacts.

182

Hill Interview, supra note 15; see also Press Release, WCET, Colleges
Comply with and Avoid State Authorization Regulations (May 2014),
http://wcet.wiche.edu/wcet/docs/state-approval/StateAuthorizationWhatAre
InstitutionsDoingPRMay2014.pdf (explaining that reasons higher education
institutions choose not to apply for authorization in a state include that “costs are
too high, they are waiting on the emerging State Authorization Reciprocity
Agreement, the institution is collecting information, and the college is waiting
for more clarification on regulations”).
183
Hill Interview, supra note 15.
184
Id.
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Conversations with members of the Forum and WICHE indicate
that these states will not be able to join the regional interstate
compacts.185 The Commission’s paper states that “a prerequisite
for state participation [in the interstate compact] . . . will be a clear
process for receiving and resolving consumer complaints.”186
California was cited as a state with insufficient consumer
protection laws such that it would not be invited to join a regional
interstate compact.187
The juxtaposition of California’s and Ohio’s processes for
authorizing higher education institutions exemplifies one of the
main problems facing the interstate compacts: whether two states
with widely differing standards for authorization can participate in
the same compact. In all likelihood, states with stringent state
authorization processes (such as Ohio) would not agree to enter an
interstate compact with states that have less regulation (such as
California). States with laws like California’s would therefore not
be allowed into the compact.188 Furthermore, Ohio’s trifurcated
system for dealing with consumer complaints is far more complex
than California’s current consumer protection scheme.
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that the interstate compacts would
include states with such differing standards.
The regional interstate compacts, though a step in the right
direction for streamlining a fragmented regulatory system, contain
several flaws. While an interstate compact system will be
beneficial for states that are eligible to join and will streamline the
state authorization process for higher education institutions, the
compact system will not include states with insufficient regulatory
structures. Perhaps more problematically, the interstate compacts
leaves students who reside in under-regulated states with little or
no recourse in the face of violations by higher education
institutions.

185
186
187
188

Id.
ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 5.
Hill Interview, supra note 15.
Id.
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C. Solving the Problem of Fragmentation with Federal
Intervention and National Consumer Protection Standards

A more inclusive and effective solution would involve the
federal government playing a greater role in the regulatory
framework by establishing a national standard of consumer
protection for higher education institutions. As demonstrated by
the adoption of the 2010 Online State Authorization Rule, the
federal government has previously shown a willingness to
intercede in the field of education by attaching strings to Title IV
federal funding. The federal government can and should do more
to protect the rights of students as consumers and a system that ties
federal funding to adequate consumer protections would establish a
framework for protecting student consumers.
1. Tying Title IV Funding to Consumer Protection
The federal government should set a new requirement for forprofit distance learning institutions that seek Title IV funds: the
institutions may only operate in states that meet a federal standard
of consumer protection. If states are encouraged to adhere to a
heightened, federally-imposed standard, then students will have a
better chance of being protected regardless of where their higher
education institution is based.
The system would create a national standard for consumer
protection regulations and encourage states to create or designate a
bureau to implement that standard. The individual state bureaus
could be modeled on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”), an independent federal agency charged with regulating
consumer protection in the realm of financial services.189 Like the

189

The CFPB was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and President Barack Obama appointed the
first director in January 2012. About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
According to section 1021 of the new legislation, the CFPB is to “implement
and, where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for
the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer
financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial products
and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.” Theresa A. Gabaldon, Half-
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CFPB, the state bureaus could write rules, enforce consumer
financial protection laws, and educate consumers about abusive
financial practices.190 The CFPB also gathers and analyzes
information to better understand consumers, financial service
providers, and consumer financial markets, a role that state bureaus
could take on as well.191
The proposed system would depend on the consumer
protection laws of individual states rather than federal consumer
protection laws, but would strive to provide a similar level of
protection to student consumers as the CFPB provides to
consumers of financial services. As such, states would be
encouraged to have a bureau of consumer protection that would (1)
receive and follow up on student complaints; (2) provide students
with comprehensive information about higher education
institutions and educate students about loan agreements; and (3)
expose and investigate deceptive practices by higher education
institutions located within the state.
a. Complaint Process
A state bureau of consumer protection complaint process
would function analogously to the CFPB’s complaint process. The
CFPB allows consumers to submit complaints about any of eleven
financial products and loans, ranging from bank accounts to
vehicle loans.192 Consumers may submit a complaint in which they
describe the issue they are experiencing and provide information
about the company.193 The CFPB reviews the complaint and works
with the company to provide a response to the consumer.194 The

A-Cup Better Than None: A Pragmatic Approach to Preventing the Abuse of
Financial Consumers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 929, 936 (2013) (quoting DoddFrank Act § 1021(a), 124 Stat. at 1979–80).
190
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, About Us, supra note 189.
191
Id.
192
Submit
a
Complaint,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
193
Id.
194
The Complaint Process, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/process/ (last visited Feb. 16,
2015).
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company must review the consumer’s complaint and inform the
CFPB and the consumer as to what steps it will take to resolve the
consumer’s complaint.195 The consumer then reviews the
company’s response, and provides feedback to the CFPB.196 Using
the aggregated data compiled by consumer complaints, the CFPB
is able to analyze which business practices pose risks to consumers
and share the data it compiles with law enforcement and federal
agencies.197
A mechanism for handling student complaints about higher
education institutions would function analogously. A state
consumer protection bureau should provide students with a forum
for filing a complaint and should work with the higher education
institution to resolve the complaints. By receiving student
complaints from across the state, a state consumer protection
bureau would be able to understand which higher education
institutions are particularly problematic and would be able to focus
its regulatory efforts on those institutions. Aggregated data from
student complaints would guide future rulemaking and help states
understand how to better enforce consumer protection laws.
Currently, in some states, student complaints are directed toward
accrediting agencies, which, as detailed in Part I.C, are illequipped to handle them.198 A state consumer protection bureau
that handles all student complaints about higher education
institutions in the state would streamline consumer complaints and
allow for easy aggregation of data.
b. Consumer Education
The CFPB also provides education for consumers. It provides
information targeted to students, the elderly, service members, and
veterans.199 A state consumer protection bureau should, like the
195
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CFPB, provide general information about for-profit distance
learning institutions, but should also go further and provide
students with the specific performance metrics of higher education
institutions within the state.200 California Education Code §
94929.5, detailed in Part III.A, provides a model for states. It
requires higher education institutions to report accurate
information about their performance.201 Students must be able to
see the salaries of a school’s graduates, the percentage of a
school’s borrowers who default on their loans, and the
accreditation status of the school and its programs.202 Additional
measures that might be useful to students include cost of
attendance and related expenses, policies related to refunds,
student withdrawal rates, and requirements for the “return of Title
IV grants or loan assistance.”203 State consumer protection bureaus
could compile this information about for-profit distance learning
institutions within their boundaries and ensure that this information
is available and easily accessible to students and parents. As in
California, this may require the passage of state laws that require
higher education institutions to report such performance measures
to the state consumer protection bureaus.
Students and Young Americans, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/students/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
200
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c. Institution Supervision

The CFPB also focuses on supervising institutions to ensure
their compliance with financial laws and to prevent deceptive
practices.204 In order to accomplish these goals, the CFPB focuses
on sharing information about deceptive practices with partners in
local, state, and federal law enforcement.205 Further, the CFPB
strives to file or settle enforcement actions within two years of
opening an investigation in order to increase deterrence and
“provide[] consumers with greater protections of law.”206
State consumer protection bureaus should work with state law
enforcement bodies to monitor higher education institutions with a
history of deceptive practices. As outlined in Part II, even states
with regulations regarding reporting or complaints related to
deceptive practices sometimes lack the resources to enforce
compliance. A key provision of the proposed federal regulation
would be adequate measures to ensure compliance with state laws.
2. Benefits of Proposed Regulation and Interaction
with Interstate Compact
An advantage of the proposed regulation is that state consumer
protection laws would work together with the regional interstate
compacts. For example, if California improved its consumer
protection framework such that it met nationally mandated
standards, it could join a regional interstate compact provided that
it adopted legislation such that it was in compliance with the
requirements of the interstate compact.207 The minimum standards
204
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of consumer protection for states will work in conjunction with the
regional interstate compacts, since the regional interstate compacts
provide a service to higher education institutions as they reduce the
transaction costs of becoming authorized in more than one state.
These reduced transaction costs mean that interstate compacts
allow a variety of institutions, both large and small, to procure
authorization to operate in multiple states.
Typically, the
institutions most able to operate in more than one state are large
institutions with the ability to dedicate resources specifically to
procuring authorization to operate in different states.
The proposed system has several advantages over a regulatory
framework that consists merely of the regional interstate compacts.
First, tying Title IV federal funding to consumer protection will
encourage states to increase their consumer protections
frameworks in an effort to encourage for-profit distance learning
institutions to locate within their boundaries. This will create an
incentive for states to ensure they are in compliance with national
consumer protection standards, and perhaps create competition
among states to quickly improve consumer protection.
Second, tying Title IV federal funding to consumer protection
will incentivize for-profit distance learning institutions to locate in
states that provide an adequate safety net for student consumers.
For-profit universities typically have a strong lobbying presence
both at the federal and state levels.208 For-profit universities that
wish to remain in certain states would likely utilize their strong
lobbying power to demand higher consumer protection within the
states in which they are located.209
are typically low-population states that do not have a large number of higher
education institutions located within them. Id.
208
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For-profit universities have previously demonstrated their lobbying
clout. In 2011, proposed stricter regulations on federal funding to for-profit
universities provoked a “ferocious response” and resulted in weaker final
regulations than those the Obama administration had previously sought. Eric
Lichtblau, With Lobbying Blitz, For-Profit Colleges Diluted New Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/politics/for-
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3. Potential Drawbacks of the Proposed Rule

One of the problems posed by this type of federal regulation is
that higher education institutions based in states without adequate
consumer protection frameworks may be forced to relocate in
order to receive Title IV federal funds, which could result in huge
costs to the higher education institution. However, much like the
federal Online State Authorization Rule of 2010, the introduction
and enforcement of the rule could be staggered.210 A provision of
the federal Program Integrity Rules—while introduced in 2010—
was not enforced until July 2014.211 The four-year grace period
provided higher education institutions with sufficient time to
comply with the new regulations. Similarly, the proposed federal
regulation could have a grace period that would provide states with
sufficient time to pass legislation to create consumer protection
frameworks that meet national standards. Moreover, a grace period
would allow higher education institutions to either pressure states
to change consumer protection standards, or provide institutions
with sufficient time to relocate to a state that meets the federal
standards.
Another potential issue that may arise is that states may not be
incentivized to increase consumer protection beyond the federally
mandated standards. In this scenario, by setting a minimum
consumer protection standard, states will, at best, only comply with
the minimum standards. As a result, states will not be motivated to
strive for excellence with regard to consumer protection for
students and motivation to innovate or provide robust protection
beyond minimum standards will be lacking. However, this could
be remedied by providing additional funds for states whose
consumer protection standards surpass national standards.
Much like the Online State Authorization Rule, the proposed
regulation will allow states to retain autonomy and simultaneously
profit-college-rules-scaled-back-after-lobbying.html. The regulation proposed
by this Article will ideally utilize the for-profit’s strong lobbying presence for
good—to increase the consumer protection safeguards for consumers in states.
210
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improve outcomes for students. States that do not prioritize or are
not currently home to for-profit distance learning institutions will
not be compelled to improve their consumer protection
frameworks for student consumers. Conversely, states with a large
presence of for-profit distance learning institutions will prioritize
meeting the nationally mandated consumer protection standards to
encourage these institutions to locate to or remain within their
borders.
CONCLUSION
The federal government’s Online State Authorization Rule
brings into sharp focus the snarled nature of state authorization of
higher education institutions offering distance learning courses.
The complications associated with state authorization additionally
affect the recourse available to students wronged by higher
education institutions. The regional interstate compacts, if
successful, will streamline the state authorization process for
higher education institutions. However, the compacts largely focus
on aiding education institutions and do little to ensure a consumer
protection framework that adequately protects students. As the
case studies of California and Ohio exemplify, states have widely
differing standards and processes for authorization and levels of
consumer protection. Because the regional interstate compacts will
leave out states where regulation is most lax, they may not help the
students who most need protection.
To remedy this, this Article proposes increased federal
regulation in the form of a federal rule that ties Title IV federal
funding for for-profit higher education institutions offering
distance education to states’ consumer protection frameworks. This
proposed regulation would encourage states to increase consumer
protection for students and simultaneously encourage for-profit
higher education institutions offering distance education to locate
in states with consumer protection schemes that meet a national
standard. These requirements will ensure both a higher quality
education for students and appropriate protections for students in
the case of improprieties by higher education institutions.
Moreover, the proposed regulations would function in concert with
the regional interstate compacts, leading to a regulatory framework
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that, in addition to aiding higher education institutions, protects
student consumers.

